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Is Money Speech?*
J. Skelly Wrightt
Lawyers are often surprised to learn that Alexander Meiklejohn,
whose name is so often invoked in epic battles over the meaning of
the First Amendment, was not a lawyer. He was a philosopher and
educator of the first rank. Perhaps this background positioned him to
discern, as he did with unique clarity, the central meaning of freedom
of speech under our Constitution. In all events it made him especially
sensitive to the Supreme Court's role as teacher to the nation. "[T]he
court," he wrote,
holds a unique place in the cultivating of our national intelli-
gence. Other institutions may be more direct in their teaching
influence. But no other institution is more deeply decisive in its
effect upon our understanding of ourselves and our government.,
In this spirit I wish to examine this Term's most important First
Amendment decision, Buckley v. Valeo.2 For I am concerned lest the
Court's teaching in that case distort our understanding of ourselves
and our government.
I. Buckley v. Valeo: Campaign Financing and the First Amendment
Under review in the Buckley case was the complex law passed in
1974 to reform the way we finance our federal election campaigns.3 I
An earlier version of this Comment was delivered at Brown University on April 27,
1976, as the Alexander Meiklejohn Lecture.
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
1. A. MEIKLEJOIIN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE
32 (1960).
2. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
3. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1436 (amending Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,
Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3) (hereinafter cited without cross-reference as 1974 Act].
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focus here on only one part of that reform-the limits placed on cam-
paign contributions and campaign expenditures.4 Congress imposed
rather strict ceilings on contributions to candidates for federal office
in order to prevent large contributors from, in effect, buying favor-
able governmental decisions. Individuals cannot give more than $1,000
to a candidate per election,5 nor can they give more than $25,000
overall.
6
Congress also imposed restrictions on campaign expenditures. It
limited to $1,000 the independent expenditures an individual or or-
ganization could make in support of a "clearly identified" candidate.
7
The term "independent expenditures" means expenditures undertaken
without the cooperation or control of the candidate.8 It was Congress's
judgment that large independent outlays might circumvent the con-
tribution limitations and themselves result in a form of political
bribery.9 Congress also placed certain higher limits on how deeply a
candidate could dig into his own pocket to finance his campaign.' 0
Sections 101-302 of the 1974 Act dealt with private financing of federal election cam-
paigns. Sections 403-408 made changes in the scheme of public financing of presidential
elections. Further amendments were made in 1976. Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nws (90 Stat.
475) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as 1976 Act].
4. There were three other major portions of the 1974t law. One portion set new
requirements for recordkeeping and disclosure on the part of candidates, their com-
mittees, and those individuals who make independent expenditures advocating the elec-
tion or defeat of identified candidates. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-437b (Supp. IV 1974) (modified
1976). Another provided for the public financing of both presidential primary and
general elections and of party nominating conventions. I.R.C. §§ 9001-9042 (amended
1976). A third part established a Federal Elections Commission to oversee the administra-
tion of the law. 2 U.S.C. §§ 437c-438 (Supp. IV 1974) (modified 1976).
The Supreme Court upheld the disclosure requirements and the public financing
provisions, but it ruled that the appointment of some of the members of the Commis-
sion by congressional leaders violated the separation~of-powers principle of U.S. CoNsr.
art. II, § 2, c. 2, which authorizes the President to appoint "Officers of the United
States." 424 U.S. at 84, 108, 140. This defect was remedied by the 1976 Act § 101(a)(1), 2
U.S.C.A. § 437c(a)(1) (Sept. 1976 Pamphlet).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1974) (modified 1976; to be recodified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1974) (modified 1976; to be recodified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a). Contributions by political committees were also restricted under the 1974 law.
18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1974) (modified 1976; to be recodified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a)
(limiting political committees, as defined therein and in 18 U.S.C. § 591(d) (Snpp. IV
1974), to a contribution ceiling of $5,000 per candidate per election).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (Supp IV 1974) (repealed 1976).
8. Expenditures "authorized or requested by the candidate, an authorized committee
of the candidate, or an agent of the candidate," id. § 608(c)(2)(B)(ii) (modified 1976; to
be recodified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a), were regarded as expenditures by the candidate, 18 U.S.C.
§ 608(c)(2)(A), (B)(ii) (Supp. IV 1974) (modified 1976; to be recodified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a),
and as contributions by the individual or group that made the actual expenditure. 424
U.S. at 46-47 & n.53.
9. See S. REP'. No. 93-689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19, reprinted in [19 74 ] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5587, 5604-05.
10. In campaigns during a calendar year, a candidate for federal office could not
make use of his personal funds or those of his immediate family in excess of the follow-
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And finally, Congress enacted overall ceilings on the total amount a
candidate and his committees could spend in advancing his candidacy. 1
Congress passed these provisions in response to political abuses
which culminated in the 1972 presidential campaign and its after-
math, commonly called Watergate. 12 Congress found that these ex-
cesses were fueled by money collected for political purposes. 13 There
can be no question that under the Constitution Congress properly
assumed responsibility for combating federal election abuses. Re-
peatedly the courts have recognized that Congress maintains a strong,
vital interest in protecting the political process from distortion and
corruption.
14
Congress, of course, knew there were difficult First Amendment
questions involved in limiting campaign contributions and expendi-
ing limits: $50,000 for presidential and vice presidential candidates; $35,000 for senatorial
candidates; and $25,000 for candidates for United States Representative. 18 U.S.C. § 608(a)
(Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976). If the individual were a candidate for United States
Representative from a state that is only entitled to one Representative, the relevant
limit was $35,000. Id. § 608(a)(1)(B) (repealed 1976).
11. The expenditure limits were $10 million for a candidate for the presidential
nomination of a political party and $20 million for a candidate for election to the office
of President. Id. § 608(c)(1) (repealed 1976). Expenditures on behalf of a candidate
nominated by a political party for the office of Vice President of the United States were
counted toward the $20 million limit for the presidential candidate. Id. § 608(c)(2)(A)
(repealed 1976). The total expenditure limits for candidates to other federal offices gen-
erally varied with the size of the voting age population of the relevant jurisdiction. Id.
§ 608(c)(1)(C)-(F) (repealed 1976). Expenditure limits were to be adjusted yearly to reflect
rising prices. Id. § 608(d) (repealed 1976).
The 1976 amendments removed all the major contribution and expenditure provisions
from Title 18 and placed them, in slightly modified form, in Title 2 of the United
States Code. 1976 Act §§ 112, 201. In response to the Supreme Court's Buckley decision,
however, Congress did make one major modification in these provisions. The expenditure
ceilings, which the Court declared unconstitutional, were omitted from 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a
(Sept. 1976 Pamphlet), the section that replaces 18 U.S.C. § 608 (Supp. IV 1974)-with
one significant exception that corresponds to a curious wrinkle in the Buckley decision.
Without even discussing possible problems under the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, see generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968), the Supreme Court left standing the
requirement in the 1974 Act § 404(a), 408(c), I.R.C. §§ 9004, 9035 (amended 1976), that
presidential candidates who voluntarily accept public funding must agree to abide by
the ceilings on total campaign outlays. 424 U.S. at 108-09. These voluntary expenditure
ceilings continue under the 1976 Act § 112, 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(b) (Sept. 1976 Pamphlet), and
have been broadened to require that presidential candidates accepting public funding
agree to limit spending from personal funds to $50,000 in both the primary campaign
and the general election. 18 U.S.C. §§ 301(a), 305(a) (Supp. IV 1974) (to be codified at
I.R.C. §§ 9004, 9035).
12. For a detailed account of these abuses, see, e.g., FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE
SELECT Comm. ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIvITIES OF THE U.S. SENATE, S. REP. No.
93-981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter" cited as FINAL REPORT]. A comprehensive
"Bibliography of Watergate Source Materials" may be found in WATERGATE SPECIAL
PROSECUTION FORCE, REPORT 265-73 (1975).
13. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 212.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 317-20 (1941); Burroughs v. United
States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 657-67 (1884).
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tures. 15 Money does facilitate communication of political preferences
and prejudices. It is also clear that money influences the outcome of
elections. Generally speaking, the more money spent in behalf of a
candidate, the better the candidate's chances of winning. Indeed, a
veteran of political campaigns has declared that money is the mother's
milk of politics.' 6
But the real questions are these: To what extent does this kind of
mother's milk poison the political process? To what extent does it
distort. the truth-seeking process that lies at the heart of the First
Amendment conception?' And most importantly, what may the peo-
ple, acting through Congress, do about it?
The Supreme Court answered these questions by saying that Con-
gTess, in passing the campaign reform law, tried to do too much. The
Justices left the statute's contribution limits in place, but they struck
down all the spending ceilings-on independent expenditures in be-
half of a candidate, on personal funds spent by a candidate in his own
campaign, and on total outlays by the candidate. Asserting that today
"virtually every means" for effectively communicating ideas requires
the expenditure of money,' 8 the Court found that these provisions
placed substantial, direct restrictions on the ability of individuals to
engage in protected political expression.'" The Court concluded that,
unlike the contribution limitations, the expenditure ceilings failed suf-
ficiently to serve the governmental interest in preventing corruption; 20
therefore, the burden they placed on "core First Amendment ex-
pression" was unconstitutional.2
15. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 571.
16. TIME, Jan. 5, 1968, at 44 (statement of Jesse Unruh, former Speaker of the
California Assembly, now California State Treasurer).
17. The First Amendment conception of which I speak is perhaps best stated by
Justice Holmes, dissenting in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919):
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the com-
petition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an
experiment, as all life is an experiment.
18. 424 U.S. at 19.
19. Id. at 58-59.
20. Proponents of the expenditure limitations had argued that the ceilings also served
to equalize the abilities of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections
and the abilities of candidates to bring their messages before the public. The Court
rejected these objectives as constitutionally illegitimate and unlikely to be achieved by
the expenditure limitations. Id. at 48-49, 54, 56-57.
21. Id. at 47-51, 53-54, 55-59. The Court was also careful to note that the Act had to
be tested against the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of association. See, e.g.,
id. at 15, 22-23, 24-29. The only extended discussion of this First Amendment right, how-
ever, appears in the Court's discussion of contribution limitations. Id. at 24-29. The
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I take issue with the Court's answers, but not primarily because of
the result reached in this particular case. Rather, I am deeply con-
cerned with the lesson the Court taught in the course of reaching its
result. Throughout its discussion of contributions and expenditures,
the Court persisted in treating the regulation of campaign monies as
tantamount to the regulation of political expression. The Court told
us, in effect, that money is speech.
This, in my view, misconceives the First Amendment. It accepts far
too narrow a conception of political dynamics in our society. It ac-
cepts without question elaborate mass media campaigns that have
made political communication expensive, but at the same time re-
mote, disembodied, occasionally even manipulative. Nothing in the
First Amendment prevents us, as a political community, from making
certain modest but important changes in the kind of process we want
for selecting our political leaders. Nothing bars us from choosing, as
I am convinced the 1974 legislation did choose, to move closer to the
kind of community process that lies at the heart of the First Amend-
ment conception-a process wherein ideas and candidates prevail be-
cause of their inherent worth, not because prestigious or wealthy
people line up in favor, and not because one side puts on the more
elaborate show of support. Nothing in the First Amendment bars us
from those steps, for nothing in the First Amendment commits us
to the dogma that money is speech.
II. Money As Speech: The Legal Argument
A. The Court's Precedents
No one disputes that the money regulated by the campaign reform
legislation is closely related to political expression. And no one dis-
putes that the First Amendment applies with special force to the
political arena.22 The legal question is thus not whether the restric-
tions on giving and spending are subject to First Amendment scrutiny
at all. The question is what degree of scrutiny should apply. There are
basically two choices 23-and I am painting here with a very broad
brush. The first is to treat campaign contributions and expenditures
right of free association played only a limited role in the Court's consideration of the
three types of expenditure ceilings and in its decision to strike them down. Id. at 22-23.
The dispositive factor was the Court's view that expenditure ceilings abridge the right of
free expression. See id. at 39, 47-51, 52-53, 55, 58-59.
22. See, e.g., Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971); Mills v. Alabama,
384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
23. See 424 U.S. at 15.
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as equivalent to pure speech. If this approach is proper, then the
giving and spending restrictions enacted in 1974 should be treated in
the same way as laws imposing a prior restraint on speech or censoring
particular points of view. Such laws are subject to the most rigorous
scrutiny known to constitutional law, and rightly So.2 4 Nothing dis-
torts the truth-seeking process so much as prior restraint or govern-
ment censorship. Even ideas utterly false serve the purpose of testing
and strengthening views with a better claim to the truth.25 For this
reason only the most intensely compelling governmental interests can
sustain such restrictions.
The second legal alternative is to treat political giving and spend-
ing as a form of conduct related to speech-something roughly
equivalent to the physical act of picketing or to the use of a sound-
truck.26 Alert and careful judicial scrutiny is still warranted, for an
ostensibly neutral regulation of conduct may merely disguise an at-
tempt at silencing a particular viewpoint. Nevertheless, a carefully
tailored regulation of the nonspeech element-the picketing or the
soundtruck-can survive without being required to pass the rigorous
test applied to restrictions on pure speech. The regulation is consti-
tutional if it serves an important governmental interest and if that
interest is unrelated to suppression of speech.2 7
When the campaign finance reform law came before the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit-the court
on which I serve-we found the second approach to be the proper one.
We held28 that political giving and spending were not pure speech,
that they should be treated as speech-related conduct under principles
announced in the leading case of United States v. O'Brien."0 And we
found the contribution and expenditure limits constitutional. 0 The
24. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Organiza-
tion for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51, 57 (1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-16 (1931). See
generally Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 648
(1955).
25. See J. S. MILL, Essay on Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTA-
TIVE GOVERNMENT 1, 15-21 (B. Blackwell ed. 1946); Bagehot, The Metaphysical Basis of
Toleration, in 2 THE WORKS or WALTER BAGEHOT 339, 343, 350 (F. Morgan ed. 1891).
26. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Cameron v. Johnson,
390 U.S. 611 (1968); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
559 (1965); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). See generally Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147, 160 (1939).
27. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
28. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 840-41 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
29. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
30. 519 F.2d at 843-44, 851-60.
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law, we thought, was carefully tailored to serve the government's
undeniably important interest in purifying elections. 31
In the O'Brien case the Supreme Court approved the conviction of
a war protester under a statute that banned the burning of draft
cards. O'Brien claimed that in publicly burning his draft card he was
merely exercising his right to free expression against the Vietnam War.
But the Court held that his act was not pure speech; that an important
governmental interest was served by preservation of draft cards; and
that his expression-related conduct in burning the draft card was sub-
ject to the restrictions Congress had enacted.
32
O'Brien used the burning of his draft card as a vehicle for expressing
his political convictions. So too the use of money in political campaigns
serves as nothing more than a vehicle for political expression. It may
not have the same overt physical quality that burning a draft card or
picketing at the statehouse has, but it remains a mere vehicle. Restric.
tions on the use of money should be judged by the tests employed for
vehicles-for speech-related conduct-and not by the tests developed
for pure speech. Our court therefore held that campaign giving and
spending, like draft-card burning, were speech-related conduct.
The Supreme Court disagreed. "The expenditure of money," it
wrote,
simply cannot be equated with such conduct as destruction of a
draft card. Some forms of communication made possible by the
giving and spending of money involve speech alone, some involve
conduct primarily, and some involve a combination of the two.
Yet this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a com-
munication on the expenditure of money operates itself to intro-
duce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny re-
quired by the First Amendment. 33
I am bound to say that this passage performs a judicial sleight of
hand. The real question in the case was: Can the use of money be
regulated, by analogy to conduct such as draft-card burning, where
there is an undoubted incidental effect on speech? However, what
the Court asked was whether pure speech can be regulated where there
is some incidental effect on money. Naturally the answer to the Court's
question was "No." But this left untouched the real question in the
31. See id. at 842-44. The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of the
governmental interest in maintaining federal elections free from corruption. See, e.g.,
Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651,
666-67 (1884).
32. 391 U.S. at 382.
33. 424 U.S. at 16.
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case. The Court riveted its attention on what the money could buy-be
it communication, or communication mixed with conduct. Yet the
campaign reform law did not dictate what could be bought. It focused
exclusively on the giving and spending itself.3 4 In short, the Court
turned the congressional telescope around and looked through the
wrong end.
Perhaps I can clarify the difference by an example. Suppose a state
enacts a law banning all political advertisements in newspapers during
the week preceding an election. Such a law targets the communication
itself. It should be subject to rigorous scrutiny. And it should be
struck down.35 If the state attorney general were to argue that the
law is justified on the ground that there is a nonspeech element
present, simply because somebody has to spend money to place a
political advertisement, he would of course lose.
But such a statute is not comparable to the campaign finance law
at issue in Buckley. The 1974 law targeted the money itself, utterly
divorced from the kind of communication-or other campaign services
-the money would buy. Congress was not trying to justify sup-
pression of pure speech by seizing on money as a nonspeech element.
It was trying to justify a straightforward regulation of the excessive
use of money as a blight on the political process. Like draft-card burn-
ing, however speech-related, this was a vice Congress had authority
to control.30
34. Justice White was able to see the distinction clearly. Id. at 259-64 (White, J.,
dissenting in relevant part).
35. Cf. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (Alabama statute banning publication
on election day of editorial supporting candidate violates First Amendment).
36. After rejecting O'Brien's applicability to the Buckley case on the ground that
campaign contributions and expenditures are speech, not conduct, the Supreme Court
went on to contend that even if they were speech-related conduct, their regulation by
the 1974 law was unconstitutional under O'Brien. 424 U.S. at 17. O'Brien required that
a regulation of speech-related conduct not be aimed at 'the suppression of free ex-
pression." 391 U.S. at 377. The Buckley Court held that the 1974 law was aimed at
suppressing communication because Congress meant it, in part, to reduce the quantity
of speech on tie part of wealthy individuals and interest groups. 424 U.S. at 17.
This rather mechanical application of the O'Brien test is unsatisfactory. Congress
meant the statute to reduce the quantity of spending on the part of wealthy individuals
and candidates, but it was unconcerned with the type or quantity of speech that might
result when people operated within the new limits. More importantly, the "suppressing
communication" test is concerned primarily with statutes that are aimed at suppressing a
particular viewpoint-statutes which discriminate on the basis of content. O'Brien itself
makes this interpretation clear. In explaining the test, the O'Brien Court took as its
example the case of Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). 391 U.S. at 382. The
California statute in Stromberg ostensibly regulated conduct-the use, in certain cir-
cumstances, of "any flag, badge, banner, or device," 283 U.S. at 361-but it did not do
so evenhandedly. It denied the use of any flag or device to those who intended thereby
to demonstrate their "opposition to organized government." Id. Demonstrators not oppos-
ing organized government could use any flag or banner they wished. See id. at 369-70.
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Let me approach the question from another angle. The main evil
against which rigorous First Amendment scrutiny is designed to guard
is content discrimination-discrimination based on the message itself.
As the Supreme Court held in unmistakable terms in 1972:
[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content .... [O]ur people are guaranteed
the right to express any thought, free from government censor-
ship. The essence of this forbidden censorship is content control.
3
T
There has been no showing that the 1974 ceilings on contributions
and expenditures discriminate against certain viewpoints. 38 In fact,
one could argue that money limitations, if properly drafted and ad-
ministered, are uniquely manageable as content-neutral controls on
political abuses.30
Let me reiterate, however, one important qualification. I am not
saying that Congress has a free hand so long as it targets money. There
Statutes of this type are invalid because they use the regulation of conduct as a
subterfuge for suppressing a certain message. O'Brien condemns statutes which are,
in this sense, aimed at suppressing communication. See 391 U.S. at 382. The 1974 law
thus did not run afoul of O'Brien. As the Buckley Court itself recognized, the campaign
reform statute did "not focus on the ideas expressed" by those subject to its limits. 424
U.S. at 17. It was content-neutral and, properly understood, did not aim at suppressing
communication.
37. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972). For a recent discussion of con-
tent discrimination, see Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amnendment,
43 U. CH. L. REV. 20 (1975). See also T. EiErsoN, THE SYsTrEMi oF FEaEoo.%l OF EXPRESSION
633-34 (1970).
38. The plaintiffs in Buckley argued that candidates who challenge incumbents are
uniquely burdened by the contribution and expenditure limits. Brief of the Plaintiffs
at 149-61, 175-83, Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Even if true, this is not
quite the same as discrimination based on content of ideas; not all challengers, by any
means, represent one particular viewpoint. In any event, the evidence of such a burden is
far from conclusive. See 424 U.S. at 33-34 (no such showing in record relative to contribu-
tion limits of SI,000). But see id. at 31 n.33 (suggesting possibility of more serious problem
when contribution limits are combined with 1974 Act's limitations on expenditures by
groups and individuals, on candidate's use of personal and family resources, and on
overall campaign expenditures, but not resolving question).
39. The capacity for abuse is directly related to the size of the contribution or ex-
penditure. Thus ceilings operate in a straightforward manner to curb the capacity for
abuse; they arc tailored rather precisely to the problem Congress sought to remedy. At
the same time, all candidates-popular and unpopular, majority and minority-use money
in roughly the same way. It is, to say the least, not immediately apparent how ceilings-
so long as they apply evenly across the board-could be designed so as to cast a dis-
proportionate burden on minority or disfavored points of view. Money restrictions, there-
fore, contrast sharply with laws which seem evenhanded but which in reality make
things especially hard for the weak and unpopular-for example, laws banning leafletting,
laws curtailing speaking in public places, or indeed, to borrow Anatole France's classic
example, laws prohibiting rich and poor alike from sleeping under bridges. A. FRANCE,
THE Ran LILY 91 (W. Stephens trans. 1894). See Kalven, The Concept of the Public
Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 30.
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are delicate links between political giving and spending, on the one
hand, and political speech, on the other. Every regulatory scheme
concerning campaign finances requires careful judicial review to make
sure that Congress maintains a close relation between the important
ends sought and the precise means chosen. Some measures may be
more clearly justified than others. For example, a far more com-
pelling case can be made for contribution limitations than for the
overall candidate spending ceilings, since the former are more closely
tied to the paramount goal of preventing political corruption. 40 Thus,
I am not suggesting that courts, when faced with regulations like
these, be less than vigilant. But the sensitive judicial task is not aided
by a blunderbuss formula that equates money and speech.4'
40. This of course was not the only goal of the 1974 law. In some contexts other
goals were equally compelling. For example, as Mr. Justice Marshall eloquently demon-
strates in his partial dissent, the limits on spending by a candidate from his personal
funds, 18 U.S.C. § 608(a) (Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976), were tailored to serve the
nation's vital interest in "promoting the reality and appearance of equal access to the
political arena," 424 U.S. at 287-90. I agree fully with Mr. Justice Marshall that § 608(a)'s
limits should have been conceived as limits on the contribution a candidate may make to
his own campaign, id. at 286-87, and therefore are justified on much the same grounds
as those the Court found persuasive with respect to the general contribution limits.
As I shall discuss more fully below, another important objective of the campaign
financing reform was to stimulate more direct, personal forms of political speech. Indeed,
that those nearing their contribution limits could still engage in more direct communica-
tions efforts was an important factor in the Court's decision to uphold the contribution
ceilings. I pause here only to ask why that same logic could not have been taken one
small step further, with the result that the ceiling on independent expenditures would
also have been recognized as constitutional.
The Court upheld the contribution limits because, the opinion explains, those limits
constitute only a "marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free
communication." Id. at 20-21 (emphasis added). This is so because people who would
otherwise give amounts greater than the statutory limits are hardly bottled up once they
reach the ceiling. Many avenues of communication remain open to them since, the Court
states, they can "expend such funds on direct political expression." Id. at 21-22 (emphasis
added). In other words, the spender could buy the newspaper ad or TV commercial or
handbills directly, instead of giving the money to the candidate for the candidate to
choose how to spend it. If he avoided collaboration with the candidate, his spending in
this fashion would not count as a contribution. Id. at 46-47 & n.53. There would be no
limits on his spending to advocate the candidate's election, because the Court struck
down the limits on independent expenditures.
But exactly parallel reasoning should have led the Court to sustain the limits on in-
dependent expenditures. Properly viewed, those limits constitute nothing but a "marginal
restriction," They do nothing but push the spender a little closer still to "direct political
expression." Under the statutory provisions for ceilings on independent expenditures,
one who has spent his limit-and RI,000 is a generous limit-hardly has his free expression
bottled up. Nothing prevents him from devoting future efforts to volunteer activity,
door-to-door canvassing, or organizing meetings. And what is this if it is not direct
political expression? It may not be the form of political expression which the Supreme
Court had in mind-expensive things like TV commercials and newspaper ads. But it is
no less a real outlet for political expression simply because it is more direct.
41. The Buckley defendants also contended that the money restrictions were valid
under a line of cases permitting government regulation of the time, place, and manner
of speaking. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
559 (1965); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). The Court rejected this argument.
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B. The Court's Premise
The premise apparently underlying the Court's treatment of money
restrictions as restraints on free expression was that "in today's mass
society" the use of money is essential for "effective political speech.
42
But does the First Amendment condemn us to accept helplessly all
the implications of the so-called "mass society"? Must we adopt the
mass society's definitions of effectiveness? I think not.
Consider this: A half-minute spot commercial can reach into thou-
sands of homes, although with a cursory message. This is the essence
of effectiveness in the mass society. And it costs money-lots of it. A
lesser amount of money, however, might suffice to purchase the paid
staff and supplies necessary to sustain a small army of volunteer
canvassers, 43 perhaps enough to reach all the same homes on a mean-
ingful, personal basis.
Which is truly more effective, the spot commercial or the volunteer
activity? It depends on whose standards one uses: those implicit in the
424 U.S. at 17-18. The logic of the Court's position, howevcr, is not immediately apparent,
for the 1974 law does, on its face, look like a regulation of the manner of speech. The
statute says, in effect, speak in a frugal rather than lavish manner.
But the Court did not see the limits in this way: "The critical difference between this
case and those time, place, and manner cases is that the present Act's contribution and
expenditure limitations impose direct quantity restrictions on political communication
and association ... ." Id. at 18 (emphasis added). The Court went on in a footnote to
emphasize the difference-it perceived between the campaign law's money limits and the
decibel limits imposed on a soundtruck operator and upheld in Kovacs: "The decibel
restriction upheld in Kovacs limited the manner of operating a soundtruck, but not the
extent of its proper use." Id. at 18-19 n.17 (emphasis in original).
The Court, in other words, erected a new distinction between statutes that regulate
manner of speech and those that may be said to regulate quantity of speech. Statutes of
the former type are permissible; statutes of the latter type are, at a minimum, subject
to the most stringent scrutiny.
But the distinction simply does not bear up under analysis. The time, place, and
manner cases dealt with restrictions that can just as easily be read as quantity restrictions.
In Kovacs, for example, the soundtruck operator was surely faced with a quantity
restriction. Operating at an unrestricted decibel level, he might have been able to reach
all the citizens of his target area by, say, driving down every third street. Operating
within the ordinance at a lower volume might have required driving down every street.
The quantity of his speech, if one chooses to view it in that fashion, has been reduced
by two-thirds. He can reach only a third of the people he could otherwise reach in a
given amount of time. Regulations of time and place of expression can generally be seen
as working similar quantity restrictions. The Court's rationale for distinguishing the
time, place, and manner cases is unconvincing.
42. 424 U.S. at 19.
43. The 1974 law is structured so as to provide added inducements for volunteer
activity. An individual who devotes his time without pay is not required to place a
monetary value on that time in order to count i against any contribution or independent
expenditure ceiling. In other words, a person can volunteer his time without limit. 18
U.S.C. § 591(e) (5)(A) (Supp. IV 1974). Moreover, the first $500 of expenses incidental to
such volunteer activity is also exempt from the ceilings. Id. § 591(e)(5)(B)-(D), (f)(4)(D),
(f)(4)(E). The Court expressly approved these inducements, noting "Congress' valid in-
terest in encouraging citizen participation in political campaigns." 424 U.S. at 36-37.
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mass society, or those implicit in the First Amendment. It is certainly
possible to argue that the volunteer, face-to-face communication is more
effective in a sense highly relevant to the First Amendment: it pro-
motes real interchange among citizens concerning the issues and can-
didates about which they must make a choice.
The Supreme Court seemed to recognize that "effective political
speech" is a multi-dimensional concept. It depends, the Court sug-
gested, on "the number of issues discussed, the depth of their explora-
tion, and the size of the audience reached. ' 44 Viewed in this light, the
effectiveness of political speakers is not necessarily diminished by
reasonable contribution and expenditure ceilings. The giving and
spending restrictions may cause candidates and other individuals to
rely more on less expensive means of communication. But there is no
reason to believe that such a shift in means reduces the number of
issues discussed in a campaign. And, by forcing candidates to put more
emphasis on local organizing or leafletting or door-to-door canvassing45
and less on full-page ads and television spot commercials, the restric-
tions may well generate deeper exploration of the issues raised. Finally,
even to the extent that smaller audiences result from diminished use of
the most expensive and pervasive media-and the campaigning so far
gives no substantial indication that this happens-the effectiveness
of a given speaker does not decline in relation to that of his opponents.
All similarly situated competitors face the same constraints. Within
those limits effectiveness still depends on the creativity of the speaker
-and on the soundness of his ideas.
44. 424 U.S. at 19 (footnote omitted).
45. Because these activities require a large amount of volunteer effort, some com-
mentators have suggested that contribution and expenditure ceilings discriminate un-
fairly in favor of those who have a lot of free time. See, e.g., Winter, Money, Politics and
the First Amendment, in H. PENNIMAN & R. WINTER, CAMPAIGN FINANCES: Two VIEWS OF
THE POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 57-58 (1971). This strikes me as a
particularly weak claim of discrimination.
In a system dominated by contributions of money, rather than of free time, all but the
fabulously wealthy must make hard choices about how they will apply limited financial
resources. For most people, making a large contribution means foregoing or postponing
something else-an expensive vacation, perhaps, or a new car. In a system where contribu-
tions of free time are more important, people are still faced with choices about the
application of a limited resource, a temporal resource. A person can, if the candidate's
success is important enough to him, forego or postpone or rearrange business commit-
ments or outside activities that consume time in order to volunteer for the campaign. I
see no reason why the temporal choice should be considered inequitable when the
financial choice is not.
If the concern is for those at the margin who really cannot squeeze out additional free
time-those who must work long hours simply to provide food and shelter for their
families-I would only observe that such people are hardly disadvantaged by contribution
and expenditure ceilings. They surely are not the ones whose political spending is cut
short by the 1974 law.
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If there is a problem latent in expenditure ceilings, it stems not from
any disparities in effectiveness among rival campaigns, but from the
fact that there are, of course, no dollar limitations on nonpolitical
speech. If campaign money ceilings were so low that political speech
really were in danger of being drowned out by commercial or other
apolitical speech, then those ceilings might well be unconstitutional.
But no one has claimed, and no one could credibly claim, that the
reasonable ceilings enacted in 1974 pose such a threat.40 There will be
time enough to remedy the problem if at some point the political
dialogue truly becomes submerged. 47 In the meantime, we would do
well to focus our concern on the danger that certain individual can-
didates will find their speech drowned out by well-heeled opponents
who can vastly outdistance them in the spending race-exactly the
danger that the overall expenditure limits were meant to minimize.
III. Money As Speech: The Pluralist Underpinnings
Though the equation of money and speech is supported by neither
the precedents nor the premise relied on by the Court, the notion may
well derive from a more basic source. If so, it is important that we
explore it. We can, I believe, identify this source by analyzing care-
fully the position of the Buckley plaintiffs, the opponents of the 1974
law, in order to discern the image .of the political process that under-
lay their opposition to limitations on giving and spending. The image
they embraced makes it natural to conclude that money is speech, but
I think we shall see that it differs significantly from the image of the
political process the First Amendment bids us to accept.
In their brief before the court of appeals, the plaintiffs argued
strongly that money is essential to effectiveness in the political con-
test.48 Again and again they asserted their central theme:
It is ... too crabbed a notion of the political process to restrain
people from demonstrating the intensity of their convictions on
particular issues. Indeed, it is hard to see how a democratic nation
can have a stable government if it does not permit intensity of
feeling as well as numbers of adherents to be reflected in the
46. See, e.g., 424 U.S. at 21-22 (no such problem in connection with contribution limits
of .1,000).
47. The Court has shown its readiness to act when reductions in degree result in
differences in kind. Compare Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 59-61 (1973) with Rosario
v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973). See 424 U.S. at 30.
48. Brief of the Plaintiffs, supra note 38, at 102.
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political process .... Campaign contributions represent a means
by which intensity can be shown ....
Of course, those who contribute money to a candidate hope to
further their political, social and economic views. .... 49
Now it is true that a government which hopes to maintain stability
must preserve for its citizens some means of demonstrating intensity
of feeling. The plaintiffs, however, evidently interpret intensity not
from the standpoint of the potential contributor, but from the stand-
point of the candidate or official who is the target of the intensity. I
say this because it is brutally obvious that the size of a contribution
provides a hopelessly inadequate measure of intensity as felt by the
giver. Consider the wealthy man who regularly contributes $5,000 to
a particular incumbent, simply to keep open his channels of com-
munication. Compare him to the student who scrapes together $100
for a candidate in whom she passionately believes. Intensity is all with
the student, but if one looks only at the dollar totals, this fact is
completely obscured. The contribution ceiling in the 1974 law in no
way prevents the student from demonstrating her genuine intensity of
feeling.
Thus, when the plaintiffs complain that a $1,000 contribution limit
thwarts the expression of intensity, they must be viewing intensity from
the standpoint of the recipient-the candidate. He certainly will feel
the heat more intensely from a $5,000 contributor than from a $100
contributor, whatever the subjective feelings of the two contributors
themselves. And, the plaintiffs argue, the First Amendment requires
that Congress not impede contributors from making candidates feel
this kind of intensity.
Consider, then, the picture the plaintiffs' brief paints for us of the
way political decisions are made. Campaign monies should be un-
restricted because they are a means by which people intensify the
pressure to get governmental decisions to come out their way. There
is competition among various viewpoints, and candidates and others
who want to see certain governmental policies adopted roll up their
sleeves and plunge into the competition with all the resources at their
command. The prospect of large contributions may, for example,
influence a legislator to vote a particular way. Or sizeable media ex-
penditures may swing an important electoral race through advanced
techniques of salesmanship. People band together and pool their funds
49. Id. at 105. Obviously the plaintiffs' observation is not limited to contributions; it
extends to expenditures as well: "[T]hose making the expenditures seek to communicate
with the public to promote views they think should become governmental policy or for
persons whom they believe will, as public officials, share those views." Id. at 100.
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in order to bring pressure on the decisionmakers or to elect different
decisionmakers in their place. The key to effectiveness is not the
soundness of the program advocated, or even the number of voters who
support the program, but rather the intensity of the pressure imposed.
This picture of the political process that emerges from the plain-
tiffs' arguments corresponds closely to a picture familiar to political
science as the special interest or pluralist model."0 This correspondence
should not be surprising, even though it has received relatively little
attention. Pluralist thinking has dominated political science for years,,"
and it traces its roots to Tocqueville,52 and even back to Madison's
celebrated Federalist No. 10.53 The pluralist view is a powerful con-
ception, and it explains much about how our government works. I do
not demean its value when I say nonetheless that it has certain short-
comings. Let me set forth the pluralist outlook in its strongest form,
so that we may clearly see the problems.
To the pluralist, the political process consists precisely of the pull-
50. Some writers have made even more explicit the pluralist underpinnings of their
attack on campaign finance reform laws. See, e.g., Sterling, Public Financing of Cam.
paigns: Equality Against Freedom, 62 A.B.A.J. 197, 200 (1976); Sterling, Control of
Campaign Spending: The Reformers' Paradox, 59 A.B.A.J. 1148, 1153 (1973). See also
Fleishman, Freedom of Speech and Equality of Political Opportunity: The Constitution-
ality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 51 N.C. L. REV. 389, 462 (1973) ("The
fact that people vote with dollars as well as ballots is to be celebrated in a democracy
rather than bemoaned.") Compare the unrestrained enthusiasm of one early writer, quoted
prominently, with minor, inadvertent alterations, in an important pluralist textbook, w.
BINKLEY g. M. Moos, A GRAMMAR OF AMERICAN POLITICS: THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 2
(3d ed. 1958):
[M]en and women who touch practical politics . . . know that men and women now
may have as many votes in government as they have interests for which they are
willing to sacrifice time and thought and money ...
. The ruling classes are those who use their craft societies, medical associations,
farm bureaus, labor unions, bankers' associations, women's leagues and the like to
influence government. Of course, it takes time and intelligence and a little money,
but not much. For fifty dollars a year [membership dues] the average family ought
to be able to buy half a dozen powerful votes in government, each vote ten times as
powerful as the vote guaranteed by the Constitution.
IV. WHITE, POLITICS: THE CITIZEN'S BUSINESS 15, 16-17 (1924).
For a dramatically contrasting view, albeit one with serious problems of implementation
and limitation, see Nicholson, Campaign Financing and Equal Protection, 26 STAN. L.
REV. 815, 821, 825-36, 853-54 (1974) (giving of large contributions is form of multiple
voting invalid under "one person, one vote" doctrine; courts could, regardless of statutory
limits, hold unconstitutional any financing system permitting large contributions).
51. See, e.g., A. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1908); R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO
DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? (1961); E. HERRING, GROUP REPRE-
SENTATION BEFORE CONGRESS (1929); E. LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS (1952); C.
LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY (1965); A. ROSE, THE POWER STRUCTURE
(1967); D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (2d ed. 1971).
52. See A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 174-80 (J. Mayer & M. Lerner eds.
1966).
53. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 57 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See D. TRUMAN, supra note 51,
at 4-7. But see note 72 infra.
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ing and hauling of various competing interest groups. Organized
groups, not individuals, constitute the only relevant political units.54
They rise and decline, coalesce and fragment, confront countervailing
groups and aid complementary groups. Through lobbying, publicity,
campaign contributions, independent expenditures, and other methods
-all of which cost money-they bring pressures to bear which ul-
timately determine the outcome of governmental decisions. They
thereby achieve a form of "functional representation," based upon
intersecting economic and social groupings, which cuts across our
usual conception of political representation based upon "one person-
one vote."' 55
The pluralist model tends to be a highly mechanistic conception.
The clash of competing groups comes to be seen as the only factor of
importance in politics. Force collides with counterforce, pressure
meets counterpressure, and the strongest force or the most intense
pressure determines the outcome of the governmental process. Some
pluralist writers even talk wistfully about the possibility of reducing
the political process to a mathematical chart. If only our techniques
were sophisticated enough, they suggest, groups pursuing interests
could all be measured and then graphed as vectors. And trends in
public policy could then be predicted because they automatically con-
form to the resultant, the mathematical sum of all the private vectors.511
Other pluralists go so far as to equate this resultant vector with the
"public interest." The very term, they imply, has no meaning apart
from the outcome of the pressure group process. Individual assertions
as to where the public interest lies are all inherently suspect. Only
the group process can be relied upon as "the practical test of what
constitutes the public interest." 7
By this pluralist line of reasoning, the First Amendment's highest
function is to let group pressure run its course unimpeded58 lest we
skew the process that determines for us the public interest. Giving and
spending money are important ways for groups to bring pressure-to
magnify intensity-and thereby to make the process work. Restrictions
on giving and spending can be nothing but unwarranted impediments
54. See, e.g., A. BENTLEY, supra note 51, at 208; E. HERRING, supra note 51, at 5-6.
See generally Hale, The Cosmology of Arthur F. Bentley, in THE BIAS OF PLURALISM
35-50 (XW. Connolly ed. 1969).
55. See generally E. HERRING, supra note 51, at 8-12.
56. W. B3INRLEY & M. Moos, supra note 50, at 6 (quoting Childs, Pressure Groups and
Propaganda, in THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCENE 205, 225 (E. Logan ed. 1936)).
57. W. BINKLEY & M. Moos, supra note 50, at 7. See Stoke, The Paradox of Representa-
live Government, in Ess.Ys IN POLITCAL SCIENCE 77, 80-83 J. Mathews & J. Hart eds.
1937); Wilson, The Pragmatic Electorate, 24 AMER. POL. SCI. RLv. 16, 33 (1930).
58. See Brief of the Plaintiffs, supra note 38, at 101-02.
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in the path of the process. It follows, in the pluralist view, that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional.
Such is the theory. But time has eroded at least the more exuberant
forms of pluralist thinking. Recent years have seen scores of books
and articles questioning the theory's assumptions or its application."0
Two major critiques deserve emphasis.
First, pluralists countenance a system which gives undeserved weight
to highly organized and wealthy groups.60 For the pluralist, this im-
balance is a virtue to be embraced, not a flaw to be redressed. Under
an unrestrained pluralist system, a clustering of people with common
interests, even if it is a majority, cannot prevail if it is without orga-
nization and without significant funds.6 ' And of course we know of
instances in our current system where the popular will is thus thwarted
-where public opinion polls tell us that a majority prefers a certain
policy, and yet that majority seems unable to carry out its wishes
against the opposition of a highly organized, narrowly based group
able to spend its money freely. Gun control provides an obvious
example.02
A number of encouraging reform efforts of recent years may be seen
as attempts to rectify this systemic imbalance. 63 The public interest
law movement, for example, often sees itself as a means for giving
diffuse but significant groups a more effective voice.0 4 The flowering
of so-called citizens' or public interest lobbies is part of the same
development. And the campaign reform legislation reviewed in the
Buckley case can also be seen in this light. In a sense, it is an attempt
to expand participation in the pluralist pulling and hauling. The
59. For a sampling of the most penetrating critiques of the pluralist viewpoint, see
H. KARIEL, TIE DECLINE OF AMERICAN PLURALISM (1961); T. LowI, THE END OF LIBFRALISM
(1969); G. MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1966); Connolly, The
Challenge to Pluralist Theory, in THE BIAS OF PLURALISM, supra note 54, at 3. See also
S. LAZARUS, THE GENTEEL POPULISTS 167-89 (1964).
60. I have pursued this line of criticism elsewhere in a somewhat different context.
Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 769, 789 (1971).
61. See Note, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069, 1070-71 n.3 (1970).
Indeed, some critics argue forcefully that the system may prevent such diffuse groups
even from achieving effective articulation of their grievances. Their grievances will be
seen not as potential issues for the public but merely as troubles afflicting private in-
dividuals. See Connolly, supra note 59, at 14.
62. See N.Y. Times, June 5, 1975, at 20, col. 4 (67% of those polled favored registra-
tion of all firearms; results consistent with surveys over three decades showing steady
support for such gun control legislation); M. HINDELANG, C. DUNN, A. AUMICK & L.
SUTrON, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1974 183-88 (1975) (summaries of
polls showing similar strong support for gun control and detailing response to particular
gun control proposals).
63. See S. LAZARUS, supra note 59, at 267-74.
64. See Note, supra note 61, at 1070-71 n.3.
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well-organized are deprived of certain financial advantages. The
decisionmakers are then better able to respond to the interests of the
under-organized, free from imperative obligations to special interest
money-providers.
There is a second and more basic critique of the pluralists' view.
Their mechanistic conception tends to drain politics of its moral and
intellectual content.65 Rather than seeing the political process as a
battle of ideas, informed by values-as the means by which the citizens
apply their intelligence to the making of hard public choices 6-
pluralists tend to view politics as a mere clash of forces, a battle of
competing intensities, a universe of vectors.
Forces can be measured by science; resultant vectors can be com-
puted by mathematics. Alexander Meiklejohn diagnosed the short-
comings of this kind of thinking with his usual penetrating insight.
He wrote:
In the understanding of a free society, scientific thinking has an
essential part to play. But it is a secondary part. We shall not
understand the Constitution of the United States if we think of
men only as pushed around by forces. We must see them also as
governing themselves.
67
The First Amendment sees people in this way. Although our political
practice may often fall woefully short, the First Amendment is founded
on a certain model of how self-governing people-both citizens and
their representatives-make their decisions.0 8 It is a model that restores
considerations of justice and morality to the political process-con-
siderations absent from the pluralist approach.09
Self-governing people do not simply let the organized groups of the
day play out their battle of influence and then vote the way of the
prevailing forces. They are more responsible, more independent than
that. Instead, they see the group process as a way of calling forth the
various positions. They listen to all-the weak and timid voice of the
under-organized as well as the sometimes bombastic, sometimes so-
65. See T. Lowi, supra note 59, at 46-54, 57-58, 68-72, 155-56, 281-82.
66. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 1, at 75, 109.
67. Id. at 12-13. Meiklejohn has made explicit his critique of pluralist thinking else-
where. Id. at 162-63. See also id. at 73-75.
68. See generally Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-78 (1927) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring), overruled, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). "The purpose of constitutional protec-
tion of speech is to foster peaceful interchange of all manner of thoughts, information,
and ideas. Its policy is rooted in faith in the force of reason." Kunz v. New York, 340
U.S. 290, 302 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
69. See T. Lowi, supra note 59, at 289-91.
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phisticated, but always elaborate communication of the affluent
highly-organized. They do their best to filter out the decibels so that
they may penetrate to the merits of the arguments. They retire and
consider the positions. And then they choose the course which seems
wisest. It may be the course of the noisy or the course of the quiet. At
times it may be the course advocated by an apparent minority. But it
is a course chosen on the merits.
Thus, what the pluralist rhetoric obscures is that ideas, and not
intensities, form the heart of the expression which the First Amend-
ment is designed to protect.70 Money may register intensities, in one
limited sense of the word, but money by itself communicates no ideas.
Money, in other words, may be related to speech, but money itself is
not speech. Courts ought to judge restrictions on giving and spending
accordingly.
The 1974 campaign reform law moves us closer, even if but a small
distance, toward the idealized First Amendment model of self-govern-
ment sketched out above. Herein lies the key to the statute's im-
portance. Here is why, far from stifling First Amendment values, it
actually promotes them. The ceilings on giving and spending take
from wealthy citizens, candidates, and organizations only certain
limited political advantages totally unrelated to the merits of their
arguments-advantages which all too frequently obscure the merits of
the arguments. In place of unlimited spending, the law encourages all
to emphasize less expensive face-to-face communications efforts, 71
exactly the kinds of activities that promote real dialogue on the merits
and leave much less room for manipulation and avoidance of the
issues.
I can hear the pluralists' rejoinder. You are deeply unrealistic, they
might charge. You swallow an l8th-century idealized vision of a process
and ignore the play of organized groups and private interests. And
indeed if they are right that the "public interest" is nothing more
than the outcome of the group process, then we should release our
70. Cf. Freund, Commentary, in A. ROSENTHAL, FEDERAL REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN
FINANCE: SOME CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS 72, 74 (Citizens' Research Found. 1972):
The right to speak is, I submit, more central to the values envisaged by the First
Amendment than the right to spend. We are dealing here not so much with the right
of personal expression or even association, but with dollars and decibels. And just
as the volume of sound may be limited by law, so the volume of dollars may be
limited, without violating the First Amendment.
:-[Large contributors] are operating vicariously through the power of their
purse, rather than through the power of their ideas, and again I would scale that
relatively lower in the hierarchy of First Amendment values.
71. See note 43 supra.
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grasp on the First Amendment ideal and let the pulling and hauling
proceed without hindrance.
But we need not accept the pluralists' proposition. We simply are
not so helpless that we must blindly equate the outcome of the group
pressure process with the public interest.72 To return to our gun
control example, it is certainly possible to assert-indeed, the case is
compelling-that the pluralist process has thwarted the public interest
for years.
Realism consists in acknowledging the group process and allowing
for it. Group activity is an essential and desirable part of the American
system, and indeed the First Amendment recognizes this: it protects
the right of assembly and the right of association. But it is simply not
true that the play of influence, of competing intensities, is -all there is
to politics. The play of ideas, the sifting of good ideas from bad, of
truth from falsehood, of justice from injustice-all these are essential
parts of our system as well. One cannot deny this without denying the
very essence of the First Amendment. One cannot deny this without
letting realism descend to cynicism.
The Framers were not so cynically realistic when they established
our form of government. Had they been, we might not have had a
First Amendment. A government dedicated to liberty was more a
72. For a thorough development of this point, see Barry, The Public Interest, in
THE BIAS OF PLURALISM, supra note 54, at 159.
Some of the pluralist writers who have equated the public interest with the outcome
of the group process are listed in note 57 supra. Even so perceptive a pluralist writer
as Robert Dahl, although he avoids the simple equation of the earlier writers, joins with
other pluralists in concluding, based on his relentlessly empirical approach, that the
concept "public interest" is fundamentally meaningless. See R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DESdo-
cRATIc THEORY, 25-27, 69 n.5 (1956). Cf. D. TRuMAN, supra note 51, at 50-51 (a totally
"inclusive interest" within a nation does not exist).
Dahl elaborates these views in the course of analyzing Madison's famous definition of
"faction," which is set forth in The Federalist No. 10. Madison's essay is often regarded
as a precursor of pluralist thinking, but the passage containing the definition makes it
clear that Madison did not regard the "public interest" concept as meaningless, nor did
he regard the essentially moral quest for its attainment as an unworthy or futile enter-
prise. Moreover, the passage suggests-and the full essay makes clear-that he considered
interest group competition as an evil to be rendered tolerable, not as a democratic safe-
guard to be embraced:
By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting t3 a majority
or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 57 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis added).
Lowi demonstrates that the moral dimension of Madison's definition is often lost
when pluralists invoke Madison as a spiritual forebear. David Truman, he points out,
quotes the definitional passage but leaves off the crucial italicized clause, thereby re-
moving from "faction" the pejorative connotation Madison intended and incidentally
obscuring Madison's moral concern. T. Lowi, supra note 59, at 296 (discussing D. TRU-
MAN, supra at 4).
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visionary than a realistic enterprise in those days. The world had
scarcely known such a creature. But the Framers persevered. And the
power of that vision of self-government which they wrote into the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights has earned the respect even of
realists. As Meiklejohn put it: "[T]he adoption of the principle of
self-government... set loose upon us and upon the world at large an
idea which is still transforming men's conceptions of what they are
and how they may best be governed." 73 "No institution," Charles
Black has written, "can be as perfect, in men or work, as its ideal
model, [but] the very mark of the truly living institution is that it has
an ideal model which is always there nudging its elbow."74 The 1974
law, in its own modest way, escalated the nudge to a gentle shove.
75 If
we are realistic, and not cynical, we will hold fast to such fragments of
progress toward the ideal the Framers held out to us.
73. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 264.
74. C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 50 (1960).
75. The court of appeals opinion in the Buckley case came to a close on a similar
note:
[Tjhese latest efforts on the part of our government to cleanse its democratic pro.
cesses should at least be given a chance to prove themselves. Certainly they should
not be rejected because they might have some incidental, not clearly defined, effect
on First Amendment freedoms. To do so might be Aesopian in the sense of the dog
losing his bone going after its deceptively larger reflection in the water.
519 F.2d at 897-98.
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